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1 Introduction
Much of the health economics literature has focussed on the e¤ects of di¤erent payment mechanisms
and insurance schemes on the utilization of medical services. In the presence of conventional service
bene…t insurance, individuals will want to use medical care beyond e¢cient levels (the traditional
moral hazard problem). Furthermore, physicians that are paid for each service they provide (in a
fee-for-service system) may not only be willing to supply ine¢ciently large volumes of care, but may
also have incentives to encourage utilization (the problem of supplier-induced demand). In order
to reduce the problems associated with moral hazard and supplier-induced demand, insurers have
used demand-side incentives (such as patient cost-sharing through co-insurance and deductibles),
as well as supply-side incentives aimed at providers (such as paying physicians through salary or
capitation, or hospitals through episode-based prospective reimbursement).
Formal models dealing with these issues have generally been speci…ed so as to involve only one
type of medical care. That is, they have abstracted from the fact that the health services sector
produces many types of care, using a variety of di¤erent kinds of inputs. For example, certain
kinds of disease may be treated through a combination of physician services and pharmaceuticals.
In other cases, there may be substitutability between outpatient services provided by primary-
care physicians and services provided by hospital-based specialists. Although the latter may be
necessary for individuals that su¤er from particularly complex and severe forms of illness, excessive
use of specialist and hospital care may be ine¢cient and inappropriate. First, for certain kinds
of illness, primary-care physicians may be able to provide treatment at lower cost. Furthermore,
specialist in-hospital care is more likely to be invasive and risky, and thus should only be used when
’medically warranted’ (Frank and Clancy, 1997). Providing incentives to ensure that patients use
the appropriate type of care is thus important both from a health perspective, and for economic
reasons. In this paper, we analyze the e¤ects of various kinds of demand- and supply-side incentives
in the context of a model in which patients and doctors must decide not only on an aggregate
quantity of health services to use in treating various kinds of illness, but also have a choice between
di¤erent kinds of providers, in particular, outpatient services rendered by primary-care physicians
or inpatient services provided by hospital-based specialists.
Although theoretical work on the economics of medical referrals is limited and quite recent,
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there is a growing empirical literature that has examined physician referral patterns.1 Overall,
4.5 per cent of visits to primary care physicians in the US result in a referral (Frank and Clancy,
1997).2 Furthermore, although hospital admissions are relatively rare (approximately 10 per cent
of individuals in the Rand Study experienced one or more admissions in a year), hospitalization
episodes are very costly so that the cost of hospital care accounts for a large portion of health care
costs.3 On average, each referral results in US$3,000 in hospital charges and professional fees (Glenn
et al., 1987). Potentially important factors that may in‡uence the use of specialist and hospital
care include whether or not patients are allowed to seek such care on their own (that is, without
a referral from a primary-care provider). Although many health care systems and managed-care
plans prohibit patient self-referrals to specialty care and in-hospital care, others do not, and it has
been estimated that in the US, 30 to 50 per cent of all specialist consultations take place as a
result of self-referrals (Forest and Reid, 1997). In American managed care plans, a common device
for a¤ecting the use of hospital services is to require a ’second opinion’ before approval is given
for hospitalization. This may be one reason that HMO patients are less likely to be hospitalized
compared to their non-HMO counterparts (Newhouse, 1993).
The empirical work provides some evidence that the rate of hospitalization is in‡uenced by
incentives both on the supply side and on the demand side. With respect to supply-side factors,
there is evidence to suggest that physicians who are paid on the basis of fee for service are less
likely to refer patients than are physicians paid through capitation (Grembowski et al., 1998).
Furthermore, in cases where primary-care physicians have a role as gatekeepers (that is, a referral
from a primary-care doctor is required for a patient to receive treatment by a specialist or in
hospital), it has been found that gatekeepers who face …nancial risks when they refer (that is, who
have to pay some of the cost of specialist and hospital care used by their patients) are less likely
to refer to specialists (Martin et al., 1989; Hurley et al, 1991). Patients also appear to respond
to demand-side incentives when making decisions with respect to specialist care. Shortell and
Vahovich (1975) …nd that patients with higher third-party coverage are more likely to use specialist
1Theoretical work on referrals include Shortell (1972), Bradford and Martin (1960), Glazer and McGuire (1992)
as well as related work by Pauly (1979) and Wolinsky (1993).
2Based on American survey data from the National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey (NAMCS) for the years
1985 to 1992.
3For example, in the Rand ’Free Plan’ (no co-payments or deductibles), the likelihood of any use of medical care
was 86.8 per cent, while the likelihood of one or more admissions was 10.3 per cent. Furthemore, the average total
expenditure (per person per year) was $982 (1991 dollars) with $536 dollars of that in in-patient expenditures (Table
3.2, page 40, Newhouse et al., 1993).
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care. Furthermore, persons that belong to a government plan and have supplemental insurance
have a higher likelihood of using specialist care than those who do not (Shea et al., 1999). The Rand
data also suggests, although weakly, that patient cost-sharing reduces total hospital expenditures
(Newhouse et al., 1993).
In this paper, we extend the study of demand- and supply-side incentives to a model in which
we explicitly consider the interaction between insurance and the choice between primary care and
in-hospital care. We …nd that such a model yields certain new insights for both types of incentives.
With respect to conventional insurance plans in which utilization is in‡uenced by demand-side
incentives (patient cost-sharing), we …nd that the moral-hazard problem associated with overutiliza-
tion of services from a given provider may be signi…cantly exacerbated because patient cost-sharing
will also in‡uence the patient’s choice of provider (i.e., their decision to be hospitalized). This
e¤ect may be an important one in searching for the optimum degree of patient cost-sharing, and is
likely to be particularly signi…cant in assessing the e¤ect of plans in which there is a lower degree
of cost-sharing for hospital care because it tends to be used in cases of serious illness. An interest-
ing …nding is that managed-care plans that use patient cost-sharing as the principal cost control
mechanism, but control hospital utilization through a second-opinion requirement, may yield a
substantially more e¢cient pattern of care than plans that rely on patient cost sharing alone.
In some models that explore the e¤ects of di¤erent insurance arrangements in an environment
of information asymmetry between providers and patients, it has been shown that paying primary-
care physicians through capitation may be e¢cient in the sense that it reduces excessive health
services utilization (Hillman et al, 1989; Wolfe et al., 1992, Léger, 2000). However, this need not
hold in a model such as ours when primary-care physicians advise patients not only regarding the
use of their own services, but also regarding the advisability of the services of other providers such
as in-hospital care provided by a specialist. Indeed, primary-care physicians paid via capitation
have an incentive to over-refer to hospital, since this may reduce the physician’s workload without
a¤ecting his or her income. On the other hand, primary-care physicians paid via fee for service may
under-refer to hospital (in comparison with an e¢cient rate) since services provided by hospital-
based specialists do not generate additional income. We analyze consequences of both kinds of
incentives, and possible mechanisms for overcoming them, in our model below.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we consider the case of
conventional insurance and physician payment through fee for service. We analyze both the case in
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which there is full information in the sense that patients are as well informed about their illness, and
the consequences of treatment as their doctors, and the case with imperfect information in which
doctors are better informed than their patients. In Section 3, we then consider managed-care plans
in which doctors are paid through capitation or salary, again with alternative assumptions with
respect to the degree of information asymmetry between patients and doctors. Conclusions are
drawn in Section 4.
2 The Fee For Service Model
2.1 Fully informed patients
In the …rst version of the model, we assume that the patient fully observes his or her illness severity
and chooses both the quantity of care and the provider, at given prices (i.e., from a ’price list’ per
episode and quantity of services supplied from each provider). We also assume that patients can
purchase insurance prior to the revelation of illness severity, at an actuarially fair price. Once
illness severity is revealed, patients will choose whether or not to buy any care at all, to buy care
from a primary-care physician (henceforth referred to as a GP), or to enter hospital to be treated
by a hospital-based specialist. In the latter two cases, they also have to decide on what quantity
of services to utilize.
Although we assume that both types of providers (GP and hospital based specialists) may
treat the patient for any illness severity, their relative e¢ciency in doing so depends on the illness
severity. Speci…cally, we model each episode of treatment as involving two types of cost, one which
is a …xed amount for each episode, and one which varies with the quantity of treatment (measured
in e¢ciency units) that is provided. Treatment in hospital is assumed to have a higher …xed cost
per episode but a lower variable cost per unit of e¤ective treatment once this …xed cost has been
incurred (relative to care provided by a GP). The episode-speci…c …xed cost may be thought of
as consisting of things like the administrative costs associated with hospital admission, as well as
diagnostic testing that typically precede treatment received in hospital. Some of this …xed cost
may be non-monetary and be born by patients directly. For example, in-hospital treatment may
require larger amounts of travel expenditure and time o¤ work than GP care. We assume that
pricing is competitive in the sense that the costs charged by providers to the patients and their
insurers re‡ect the real opportunity costs of producing the corresponding services.4
4It is important to distinguish between episode-speci…c …xed costs, and costs that are …xed for the provider in the
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Formally, we specify a model in which the representative consumer i’s utility depends on con-
sumption X and health H , as well as on a state variable µ which we interpret as an illness severity
variable. Ex ante, the patient does not know what µ is going to be, though it is assumed that its
cumulative distribution function F (µ) is known. In this section, we also assume that once nature
has generated a value of µ, the patient knows what it is. Given µ; the patient maximizes utility by
choosing a provider j where j may be either G (for general practitioner) or S (for in-hospital care
provided by a specialist); we also assume that the patient can choose no care at all (j = N). If j
is G or S, the patient also chooses a quantity qj . In this section, the patient is supposed to have
a conventional insurance contract with a co-payment rate of ¯ and premium ®. We assume that
insurance is provided in a competitive market. The ¯ and its corresponding ® which will prevail in
equilibrium will than be those that maximize expected utility.
In each state, the patient receives a (state-independent) income I . Since µ is known ex post and
utility is maximized in each state, ex ante utility is maximized as well, so the patient solves the
problem:
max
qj ;j
Z
µ
U [X (µ) ; H (µ)]dF(µ); j = G;S; N (1)
subject to
X = I ¡ ¯(F j + cjqj (µ)) ¡ ® (2)
H = qj (µ) ¡ µ (3)
and where,
® = (1 ¡¯)
Z
µ
£
Fj + cjqj (µ)
¤
dF(µ) (4)
It is important to note that the …xed cost (F ) and the marginal cost (c) are provider-type
dependent, and, by assumption, FS > FG but cS < cG.
sense that they depend neither on the number of treatment episodes nor on the quantity of treatment supplied. The
analysis in this paper focusses on the former.
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To solve the above problem, the patient …nds quantities qj that are optimal when the provider
is G or S, and then compares the level of maximized utility, represented by the provider-speci…c
indirect utility function V j , for each provider type (including no care at all).
When j = G or S, the …rst order condition for the provider-speci…c optimal value of qj satis…es:
UX(¡¯cj)+ UH = 0 (5)
Given (5) it is easy to show that:
Proposition 1 Conditioning on purchasing some positive amount of care (that is, having paid the
co-payment with respect to the …xed cost), the quantity of care demanded for a particular type of care
(either GP or in-hospital care) is increasing in illness severity for j = G or S if UXH=UHX ¸ 0
(su¢cient but not necessary), i.e.
@qj
@µ
> 0 (6)
Proof: See Appendix 1.
Proposition 2 For a given choice of provider, utility is decreasing in illness severity, i.e.
@V j
@µ
< 0 (7)
for j = G or S and N .
Proof: By assumption, utility is decreasing in illness severity for a given qj . Thus for individuals
who consume no care, utility is decreasing in µ: It is also decreasing for j = G or S. Suppose that
this were not the case. Suppose that V j(bµ(bq)) > V j(eµ(eq)) where bµ > eµ and bq > eq. However, this
would imply that V j(eµ(bq)) > V j(eµ(eq)) which is a contradiction given that eq is the utility maximizing
quantity of care for illness severity eµ.Q.E.D.
If the choice of ’No care’ is ever optimal, it will be at the lowest values of µ (i.e., for the patient
with least severe illness). Also, if care provided by both G and S is part of the optimal path, G
will be chosen at lower values of µ and S at higher values.5
5It may be the case that for a given illness distribution and cost functions that patients will either (i) never consult
a GP (i.e., go from not consuming care to being hospitalized), or (ii) are never hospitalized. We exclude these two
cases in the discussion.
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To see this, let µC1 denote the critical value where illness severity is such that the consumer is
indi¤erent between consuming ’no care’ and consulting a GP. Similarly, let µC2 denote the critical
value where illness severity is such that the consumer is indi¤erent between consulting a GP and
being hospitalized. The First Order Conditions for optimal choices of µC1 and µC2 are given by (8)
and (9) respectively:
UN ´ U (I ¡ ®; ¡µC1) = U (I ¡ ®¡ ¯ ¡FG + cGqG¤¢ ; qG¤¡ µC1) ´ UG (8)
UG ´ U(I ¡® ¡¯ ¡FG+ cGqG¤¢ ; qG¤ ¡ µC2) = U(I ¡® ¡¯ ¡F S + cSqS¤¢ ; qS¤ ¡ µC2) ´ US (9)
For a diagramatic consideration of these conditions consider …gure 1. Each of the curves D(µ)
is a compensated demand curve associated with the utility-maximizing choice of qG (that is, when
j = G). For low values of µ, the question whether the person will utilize any care depends on whether
the area under the compensated demand curve above ¯cG (the consumer surplus associated with
the optimal choice of qG) is larger or smaller than ¯FG. For larger values of µ, the choice between
S (in-hospital care) and G (GP care) depends on the incremental consumer surplus associated
with lowering the consumer’s e¤ective price at the margin from ¯cG to ¯cS, in comparison with the
di¤erence ¯
¡
FS ¡FG¢. At the critical µ, the consumer is just indi¤erent between the two, so that
denoting by UG and US the optimized utility when receiving services from G and S respectively, it
must be true that US = UG, so that the optimal quantities are at qS and qG in …gure 1, respectively.
<Insert …gure 1 here>
It is interesting to note that at µC2, the quantity of e¢ciency units of care purchased from a
GP (qG) is less than that purchased when in hospital (qS). That is, at the point where the patient
is just indi¤erent between GP care and hospitalization, the consumption of e¢ciency units of care
purchased increases in a discontinuous manner.
We can now prove:
Proposition 3 In the neighbourhood of the critical value of µC2, total expenditures on hospital care
is larger than total expenditure on GP care.
Proof: Since the compensated demand curve slopes downward, it must be the case that qS > qG.
But since UG = US, this means that XG (consumption under GP care) must be larger than XS
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(consumption under Specialty care), which require F S + cSqS(µ) > FG + cGqG(µ).
2.1.1 The e¤ect of insurance on the optimal path (the full information model)
We now examine the role of insurance in the above model; more speci…cally, we consider how a
change in insurance coverage will alter both the mix and quantities of health services purchased.
Although a decrease in the co-insurance rate (for a given provider type) will lead to greater
consumption (the well-know moral hazard problem), a change in insurance parameters may also
lead to changes in the optimal path of providers. That is, it is likely to have an e¤ect on the ’critical
values’ µC1 and µC2:
Proposition 4 For a given provider, a decrease in ¯ (the co-insurance rate) will increase the
quantity of care demanded, i.e.
@qj
@¯
< 0
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Proposition 5 For a given insurance premium ®, a decrease in ¯ (the co-insurance rate) will
decrease the critical values of µC1 and µC2, i.e. the critical point where the patient switches from
’no care’ to ’GP care’ and the critical point where the patient will switch from ’GP care’ to ’in-
hospital care’ will both occur at lower severity of illnesses.
Proof: See Appendix 3.
In reality, of course, a lower ¯ will cause the insurance premium to rise, which will have an
income e¤ect. When this is taken into account, it is no longer necessarily true that the critical
values of µC1 and µC2 will be lower in the new equilibrium with a lower ¯. However, the income
e¤ect is likely to be small, so that in reality µC1 and µC2 are likely to fall with reduced cost-sharing.
This also implies that, ceteris paribus, patients will be hospitalized more often.
Next we show:
Proposition 6 An insured consumer will choose an ine¢ciently small critical value µC1at which
to switch from ’no care’ to ’GP care’ and an ine¢ciently small critical value µC2 at which to be
hospitalized.
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Proof: Recall that the critical value µC2 is characterized by (9). Since the compensated demand
curve slopes downwards, qS¤ > qG¤. In order for (9) to hold, it must then be the case that
FS + cSqS¤ > FG+ cGqG¤: Now, let E denote the expected utility of the representative consumer.
Consider now the e¤ect of a change in the critical value µC2 on expected utility, i.e. dE
dµC2
.
dE
dµC2
= US ¡ UG + dE
d®
d®
dµC2
= 0 +
@E
@®
£¡
FG + cGqG¤
¢ ¡ ¡FS + cSqS¤¢¤(1 ¡ ¯): (10)
Given that @E@® < 0 and
¡
FG+ cGqG¤
¢¡¡F S + cSqS¤¢ < 0, dE
dµC2
> 0: The proof for dE
dµC1
is analogous.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 has implications for the e¢cient degree of cost sharing, or equivalently, the de-
sign of a second-best insurance plan. To see this, note that treating µC2, for example as an
endogous variable, the consumer’s expected utility can be written as EU = EU (¯;µC2; ®(¯;µC2)).
Di¤erentiating with respect to ¯, one obtains:
dEU
d¯
=
µ
@EU
@¯
+
@EU
@®
@®
@¯
¶
+
dµC2
d¯
µ
@EU
@µC2
+
@EU
@®
@®
@µC2
¶
(11)
The …rst term within round brackets re‡ects the standard trade-o¤ between the incremental
loss from less complete insurance and the reduction in the conventional moral hazard e¤ect as the
degree of cost sharing is increased, holding µC2 constant; if µC2 were given, it would have to be zero
in a second-best optimal plan. However, if (11) is evaluated at the critical value that the consumer
would choose for a given value of ¯ and ®, the …rst term inside the second set of brackets would
be zero. Moreover, since FG + cGqG(µ) < FS + cSqS (µ), the insurance premium ® is decreasing
in µC2. Therefore if the critical value of µC2 is chosen by the consumer, equation (11) would be
positive at the value of ¯ where the …rst term in square brackets would be zero (since µC2 increases
with ¯ and @EU@® < 0).
Taking this e¤ect into account, it is clear that the optimum degree of cost sharing is higher when
the e¤ect through the choice of critical value µC2 is taken into account, than it would be for a …xed
µC2. Moreover, suppose it were possible for the insurer to verify the value of µ. If this could be
done at no cost, an insurance policy that speci…ed optimally chosen values of both ¯, and µC2 would
involve a µC2 higher than what consumers themselves would choose at any given ¯, but would give
10
a higher expected utility than a policy specifying an optimally chosen cost-sharing parameter ¯
alone (i.e., it would ’delay’ hospitalization but yield a higher expected utility). Managed care plans
requiring a second opinion before covering hospitalization, but in other ways similar to conventional
insurance, can be regarded as real-world examples consistent with this …nding.
The above logic also holds with respect to the critical value µC1 at which the consumer would
…rst seek GP care. That is, an insured consumer will choose an ine¢ciently low level of µC1, and
the optimum degree of cost-sharing will be higher if the e¤ect of ¯ on µC1 is taken into account,
in comparison with the case where µC1 is taken as …xed. If µ could be costlessly observed by the
insurer, imposing an exogenous bound on µC1 would also be second-best welfare improving.6
2.2 Fee-for-service model with asymmetric information
In the preceding section, it was assumed that patients could costlessly and perfectly observe their
illness severity µ. In this section, we modify the model by incorporating the idea of information
asymmetry between doctors and patients. We do this by introducing the assumption that patients
can only imperfectly interpret the symptoms on which they base their estimate of their illness
severity.
More precisely, assume that the distribution F (µ) from which illness severity is drawn is bounded
by µ0; µLand is subdivided into L intervals
£
µl¡1; µl
¤
; l = 1; :::;L. Although the patient does not
observe the exact value of µ, we assume that he or she can distinguish between these intervals (classes
of illness); that is, the patient knows in which interval his or her true µ is located. However, there is
information asymmetry: A physician can costlessly observe each patient’s precise µ (can costlessly
diagnose the patient’s illness).
We continue to assume that doctors, both GPs and hospital-based specialists, are paid on the
basis of fee for service and that both have an incentive to exploit their superior information in the
sense that their net income is higher the more services they provide. We also assume that doctors
know the boundaries of the intervals that de…ne the patient’s information. In this case doctors
always have an incentive to tell patients that their illness severity parameter is at the upper end of
the relevant interval.7
6Imposing a µC1 (i.e., a point at which th patient may seek general medical care) may be impossible to implement
as there can be no gatekeeping to GP care.
7Formal models of asymmetric information in medical care include Dranove (1988) and Rochaix (1989). Both
authors specify probability distributions that link patients’ beliefs about the way they should be treated, to the ’true’
underlying illness conditions, and employ models in which the patient’s problem is whether to accept or reject a
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The above analysis applies in every interval except the one that contains the critical value µC2
at which a well-informed patient would switch from treatment by a GP to treatment in hospital.
Denote this interval by r2. For a patient with any value of µ in this interval, a GP would have
an incentive to tell patients their illness severity was just below µC2; a hospital-based specialist, in
contrast, would say that it was at the upper end of the interval. Similarly denote by r1 the interval
which contains µC1. In that interval, a GP would have an incentive to tell patients their illness
severity was at the upper end of the interval.
Assuming that patients correctly perceive their physicians’ incentives, they realize that in reality,
their illness severity is unlikely to always be at the upper end of the relevant interval. However,
they have no way of …nding out what the true value of illness is. As a result, they must decide on
the quantity of treatment to receive (and, in the interval r2, from what provider), knowing only
which interval they are in.
Assuming patients know that distribution function F (µ), for a given interval l, insurance pre-
mium ®, and co-insurance rate ¯, the patient maximizes expected utility for the interval by choice
of qjl . The …rst order conditions are given by:Z µl
µl¡1
h
UX(qjl ; µ)(¡¯cj) + UH(qjl ; µ)
i
dF (µ) = 0 (12)
where, j = G for intervals l = r1 + 1; :::; r2 ¡ 1 and j = S for intervals l = r2 + 1; :::;L. For
l = r1 (that is, the interval that contains µC1), j may be N or G and for l = r2, j may be G or S
depending on which choice yields the higher level of utility at the quantity that maximizes expected
utility. As before, an actuarial fairness constraint of type (4) but with a constant quantity qjl in
each interval, will hold in equilibrium.
Clearly, expected utility with imperfect information must be lower than for the case where
the patient can observe µ. Furthermore, as before, it is now possible to consider the problem
of …nding the insurance contract f¯; ®(¯)g that is second-best optimal in the sense of balancing
appropriately the moral-hazard loss associated with overutilization of health services against the
gains from more complete insurance. In solving this problem one would have to take into account
doctor’s treatment recommendation, based on their beliefs about their illness condition, and their beliefs about the
doctor’s information and strategy. The solution depends in part on either the cost of not being treated (Dranove)
or of obtaining a recommendation from another doctor (Rochaix). Our approach simpli…es the problem both by
the way we specify patient beliefs, and because we model the quantity of treatment as being decided by the patient;
asymmetric information remains important, however, because it in‡uences the way the patient treats information
conveyed by doctors in making the quantity decision.
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that discontinuities in the function ®(¯) may exist at points where the consumer changes from
j = N to j = G in r1 and from j = G to j = S in r2.
3 Managed care
In the previous section, we assumed that patients were covered by a conventional insurance plan in
which they themselves decided what quantity of services to utilize, given their information about
illness severity. Doctors were assumed to be paid on the basis of fee for service, and their role was
limited to supplying the quantity the patients decided to utilize, given their insurance contract; the
insurer’s role was that of a passive payer of bills.
In this section, we consider insurance plans in which the insurer takes a more active role in
in‡uencing the services their patients utilize, i.e., managed care plans. We characterize such plans
as insurance contracts with no patient cost sharing (that is, the parameter ¯ in the preceding
section’s model is set to zero), but with a speci…c set of quantities for di¤erent illness severities,
and critical values µC1and µC2 at which coverage will change from no care to GP care and GP care
to in-hospital care respectively.8;9
3.1 Perfect information
Consider …rst the case where there is perfect information in the sense that the illness severity
parameter µ is costlessly observable to insurers as well as to patients and doctors. In this case,
insurers can o¤er plans of the form
©
qj(µ); µC1; µC2; ®
ª
where ® is the actuarially fair premium.
With a competitive insurance market, the equilibrium contract will be the one that maximizes
consumer’s expected utility subject to an actuarial fairness constraint. For future reference, the
…rst order conditions corresponding to this equilibrium include:
UH
¡
q¤G; µ
¢ ¡¸cG = 0 if µ 2 £µC1; µC2¤ (13)
UH
¡
q¤S ; µ
¢ ¡ ¸cS = 0 if µ 2 £µC2; µL¤ (14)
8Baumgardner (1991) is an early paper that characterizes managed care plans as insurance that uses speci…ed
quantities of care, rather than patient cost-sharing, as a way of limiting costs.
9As discussed further on, in the model of imperfect information, the contract will not specify a critical value µC1
(a point after which the patient is allowed to consume GP care) as it is not credibly enforceable.
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U(q¤G(µC1)) ¡U (q¤N(µC1)) ¡ ¸(FG + cGq¤G(µC1)) = 0 (15)
U (q¤S(µC2)) ¡U (q¤G(µC2)) ¡¸(FS + cSq¤S(µC2) ¡ FG ¡ cGq¤G(µC2)) = 0 (16)
where q¤j(µC1), j = N; G denotes the optimally chosen level of care at µC1 when the provider is
N or G, q¤j(µC2), j = G; S denotes the optimally chosen level of care at µC2 when the provider is
G or S and where ¸ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with actuarial fairness constraint given
by:
® =
Z
µ
£
F j + cjqj(µ)
¤
dF (µ) (17)
A plan characterized by (13) to (17) is equivalent to a set of state-contingent contracts for health
services. By itself, such a plan is not su¢cient for attaining a …rst-best optimum in a conventional
sense since a …rst-best optimum also requires that consumers be able to enter into state-contingent
contracts for consumption as well as for health services. But if µ is indeed costlessly observable,
there is no reason why such contracts couldn’t exist. For example, state-speci…c consumption
levels could be optimally chosen via state-contingent premium adjustments, making ® function of
µ, ®(µ). If such contract were possible, the …rst-best optimum would be attainable.
3.2 Information asymmetry
In general, of course, the assumption that the patients’ illness state is costlessly observable to
either the insurer or the patient is not realistic, and …rst-best state-contingent contracts do not
exist. However, real-world managed care contracts retain the principle of putting restrictions on
the patient’s right to choose which provider to use, and what quantity of services to utilize. In
managed-care plans, the latter decisions are e¤ectively made by physicians who are under contract
with these plans. Cost control is accomplished by specifying the latter contracts in such a way
that the physicians have an incentive to limit utilization and control aggregate costs.
In this paper, we assume that physicians in managed-care plans, whether primary-care physi-
cians or hospital-based doctors, are paid through capitation or salary. Both forms of payment imply
an incentive to limit the quantity of services supplied to each patient, since each unit of service
involves a cost to the doctor (in the form of time and e¤ort), but results in no additional income.
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However, as noted in the introduction, it also involves an incentive on primary-care physicians to
refer patients to hospital whenever they are able to do so.
If patients cannot observe precisely their illness severity parameter µ, physicians on capitation
or salary have an incentive to exploit their superior information by downplaying the seriousness of
the patient’s illness and supply fewer services than the patient would utilize if he or she were fully
informed.10 As in the previous model, patients, realizing this, will disbelieve their doctors’ advice.
In this case however, they cannot react by selecting a quantity di¤erent from that implied by the
doctor’s advice.
As in the previous section, suppose that patients can only tell in which of a series of intervals
of the form
£
µl¡1; µl
¤
their illness severity parameter falls. An implication of this information
structure is that there is no point for insurance contracts to specify more than one value of q for
any interval and provider. (Given the doctor’s incentive, the patient would always assume that the
doctor would provide the lowest amount speci…ed for that interval.) As a result, the equilibrium
contract would, with one exception only, specify a single quantity of treatment in each interval.
The exception is the interval containing the critical value µC2 (where the patient …rst seeks in-
hospital care) which we have denoted r2. Although a general practitioner paid by capitation has an
incentive to refer a patient anywhere in this interval to hospital, hospital doctors are also assumed
to observe the patient’s true illness severity µ. They can therefore refuse to accept patients with
a µ below a contractually speci…ed level.11 For this reason, a managed care contract can credibly
specify a critical µC2 in this interval such that the patient will be treated in hospital if and only if the
µ observed by the doctor is above that level, as well as separate quantities to be supplied depending
on where the patient is treated. Under imperfect information, a contact cannot credibly specify
µC1 (the illness severity at which a consumer would …rst be allowed to seek medical treatment) as
the physician would always have an incentive to refuse treatment (within the critical interval) by
reporting an illness severity below µC1. Formally, therefore the insurance contract in this case will
take on the following form:
fqGl (l = r1; :::; r2 ¡ 1); qGr2; µC2; qSr2; qSl (l = r2 + 1; :::; L); ®g (18)
10We assume implicitly that neither patients, nor the insurance provider, can infer ex post whether or not the
treatment was appropriate (within each illness class).
11Note that hospital-based specialists are also paid by capitation and also have an incentive to treat as few patients
as possible.
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where ® is the actuarially fair premium de…ned by (17).
As before, if the insurance market is competitive, the equilibrium contract is the one that max-
imizes the representative consumer’s expected utility, subject to the actuarial fairness constraint.
The necessary …rst order conditions are:
Z µl
µl¡1
UH(qjl ; µ)dF (µ)¡ ¸
³
Fj + cjqjl
´
P (l) = 0 (19)
for l = r1; :::; r2 ¡ 1; r2 +1; :::; L and P (l) = R µlµl¡1 dF(µ) and where j = G for r1 + 1; :::; r2 ¡ 1
and j = S for r2 +1; :::; L
Z µC2
µr2¡1
UH(qr2(G); µ)dF(µ) ¡ ¸
¡
FG+ cGqr2(G)
¢
P
¡
r2; G
¢
= 0 (20)
Z µr2
µC2
UH(qr2(S); µ)dF(µ) ¡ ¸
¡
F S + cSqr2(S)
¢
P
¡
r2; S
¢
= 0 (21)
where P
¡
r2;G
¢
is the proportion of patients that fall in that interval r2 who use general care
and where P
¡
r2; S
¢
is the proportion of patients that fall in that interval r2 that use in-hospital
specialty care.
U(qr2(µ
C2;S)) ¡U (qr2 (µC2;G)) ¡ ¸(FS + cSqr2(µC2; S) ¡FG ¡ cGqr2 (µC2;G)) = 0 (22)
and the actuarial fairness constraint (®) given by (17).
Clearly, a contract of this form will yield an expected utility that is lower than in the full
information case. A more interesting question is whether it will yield a higher expected utility than
the second-best optimal conventional contract under information asymmetry. As in the case with
observable illness severity parameters, this cannot be guaranteed in general if there are no state-
contingent markets in consumption. However, there is no reason why a managed-care contract
of this form could no specify, for each interval, both a quantity qjl of medical services, and an
associated premium adjustment. Formally, this would be equivalent to specifying a schedule of net
premiums ®l, l = 1; :::; L. We then have:
Proposition 7 Under imperfect information, the optimal managed-care contact of the form (18)
with optimally chosen interval-speci…c premiums ®l yields higher expected utility than the optimal
conventional contract of the form f®; ¯(®)g.
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Proof: Under a conventional contract with imperfect information, the values of health services
utilization and consumption are both constant in each interval l, but are chosen so as to satisfy
restriction of the form (11). With a managed-care contract with interval-speci…c premiums, the
constant levels of health services utilization and consumption in each interval can be optimally
chosen without restrictions.
Proposition 7 would still be true if consumers in conventional plans always knew whether or not
their illness severity parameter µ were above or below the optimum critical value of µC2 and could
choose appropriately among providers in the r2 interval. In practice, however, a substantial part
of the e¢ciency gains achievable through a second-best optimal managed care plan of the form (18)
may be due to the fact that consumers in conventional plans do not know where in the r2 interval
they are and, as a result, can only choose one type of provider in that interval. If they consistently
choose S (that is, choose in-hospital specialty care), total costs are likely to be considerably higher
than they would be if those below µC2 would choose G. Indeed, studies of the reason why HMOs
in the US are able to provide care at costs below those of conventional plans have pointed to less
utilization of hospital services as an important part of the explanation.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the analysis of the interaction between insurance and health services
utilization to the case where there is a choice for consumers with di¤erent illness severity not only
with respect to the quantities of services to utilize, but also among types of providers with di¤erent
cost conditions; our main example has been the choice between outpatient primary-care physicians
and treatment in hospital.
Our analysis shows that consideration of the patient’s incentive to choose between outpatient
and hospital care is important for …nding the e¢cient degree of patient cost sharing in models
of second-best optimal conventional insurance: That patients with lower degrees of cost sharing
have too little of an incentive to choose the lowest-cost provider. This loss is in addition to that
associated with the tendency of consumers with lower cost sharing to overutilize services from given
providers.
Generally this result holds as well when it is assumed that there is information asymmetry
between patients and providers, even though in this case outpatients providers paid via fee for
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service may have an incentive to understate patients’ illness severity in certain circumstances, in
order to discourage them from seeking hospital care.
We also consider the case where insurance takes the form of prepayment plans in which the
quantity of care in di¤erent states is not chosen by the patient but is speci…ed in the insurance
contract. If it is assumed that the patient’s illness state is costlessly observable by patients and
insurers as well as by doctors, it is possible to design a prepayment plan of this form that is …rst-best
optimal both in the sense of making patients utilize the e¢cient volume of services given the choice
of provider, and to choose e¢ciently between the two kinds of provider in given illness states.
If there is asymmetric information in the sense that illness severity cannot be perfectly ob-
served by patients and insurers, …rst-best prepayment contracts cannot be credibly enforced. How-
ever, second-best prepayment plans can be designed through managed-care contracts under which
providers are subject to supply-side incentives to control service utilization (for example, by being
paid through salary or capitation), and the quantity of care promised under the plan is contingent
on the consumers’ (imperfect) information regarding their illness severity. Although any such plan
clearly must yield lower expected utility than a …rst-best prepayment plan would, we …nd that
a second-best optimal managed care plan may dominate (under certain condition) a second-best
optimal conventional plan with cost control through demand-side cost sharing.
Although we believe that these results are of considerable interest, their signi…cance of course
is tempered by the restrictiveness of the assumptions built into the models from which they are
derived. In particular, the assumption that all consumers face the same probability distribution for
the illness severity parameter rules out consideration of problems with cream skimming and adverse
selection. Another important assumption is that even in the cases where patients and insurers
cannot observe precisely the patient’s illness severity parameter, they can observe the quantities of
services that providers render. If these quantities are imperfectly observable as well, the superiority
of managed care plans over conventional insurance is no longer guaranteed.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Appendix 1
Proof that @q@µ > 0.
We know that by the implicit function theorem that @q@µ = ¡FµFq :
Where,
Fµ = ¯cUXH(:; :) ¡ UHH(:; :) > 0 (23)
if UXH(:; :) ¸ 0 and UHH(:; :) < 0:(Su¢cient but not nessary)
and where,
¡Fq = ¡(¯c)2UXX(:; :)+ ¯c(UXH(:; :) +UHX(:; :)) ¡ UHH(:; :) > 0 (24)
if UXX(:; :) < 0; UHH(:; :) < 0; and UXH(:; :)=UHX(:; :) ¸ 0: (Su¢cient but not necessary)
Thus, @q@µ > 0. Q.E.D.
5.2 Appendix 2
Proof that @q@¯ < 0:
We know that by the implicit function theorem that @q@µ = ¡F¯Fq .
From appendix 1 we know that Fq > 0 if UXX(:; :) < 0; UHH(:; :) < 0 and UXH(:; :)= UHX(:; :) ¸
0: (Su¢cient but not necessary).
and,
F¯ = cUX(:; :) ¡ ¯cUXX(F + cq + ®0(¯)) + UHX(:; :)(F + cq +®0(¯)) > 0 (25)
if UHX(:; :) ¸ 0 and F + cq ¸ ®0(¯) (Su¢cient but not necessary).
Thus @q@¯ < 0: Q.E.D.
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5.3 Appendix 3
Recall that µC1 is de…ned as the illness severity where:
UN ´ U (I ¡ ®; ¡µC1) = U (I ¡ ®¡ ¯ ¡FG + cGqG¤¢ ; qG¤¡ µC1) ´ UG (26)
As a result, points ’a’ and ’b’ (represented on …gure 2) both lie on the same compensated demand
curve for the critical point µC1, which we label D(¯c;®;µC1). The shaded consumer surplus area
in the diagram must equal the di¤erence in out-of-pocket expenses attributable to the …xed costs
between GP care and no care at all. That is, it must be the case that
¯FG =
Z 1
¯cG
D(¯c; ®;µC1)d(¯c) = ¯
Z c1
cG
D(¯c;®; µC1)dc
where the second equality is derived using standard change-of-variable techniques. If ¯ falls,
the value of the integral on the right hand side will increase (since @D=@¯c) < 0), for given ® and
µC1. Thus, for given ®, equality must occur at a smaller value of µC1 since @D=@µ > 0.
<Insert …gure 2 here>
Furthermore, recall that µC2 is de…ned as the illness severity where:
UG ´ U(I ¡®¡ ¯ ¡FG + cGqG¤¢ ; qG¤ ¡ µC2) = U (I ¡®¡¯ ¡FS + cSqS¤¢ ; qS¤¡ µC2) ´ US (27)
As a result, points ’a’ and ’b’ (represented on …gure 3) both lie on the same compensated demand
curve for the critical point µC2, which we label D(¯c;®;µC2). The shaded consumer surplus area
in the diagram must equal the di¤erence in out-of-pocket expenses attributable to the …xed costs
between in-hospital care and GP care. That is, (using the same change-of-variable technique as
above), it must be the case that
¯(F S ¡ FG) =
Z ¯cG
¯cs
D(¯c;®; µC2)d(¯c) = ¯
Z cG
cS
D(¯c; ®;µC2)dc:
If ¯ falls, the value of the integral on the right hand side will increase, for given ® and µC2.
Thus, for given ®, equality must occur at a smaller value of µC2.
<Insert …gure 3 here>
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